Agreement Between Germany And Russia Not To Fight Each Other
Despite a warning from the Comintern, German tensions increased when the Soviets declared in September that they had to enter Poland to “protect” their ethnic Ukrainian and Belarusian brothers from Germany. Molotov then admitted to German officials that the apology was necessary because the Kremlin could not find any other pretext for the Soviet invasion.  The German presence in the Soviet capital during the negotiations can be seen as rather tense. German pilot Hans Baur recalled that the Soviet secret police followed every step. Their mission was to inform the authorities when he left his residence and where he was going. Baurs` guide informed him: “Another car would attach to us and follow us about 50 meters to the back, and everywhere we went and whatever we did, the secret police were after us.” Baur also remembered the attempt to tip his Russian runner, which prompted a stern exchange of words: “He was angry. He wanted to know if it was the thanks he received for doing his best for us to take him to prison. We knew very well that it was forbidden to take advice.  The new agreement between Soviet Russia and Germany comes as no surprise to those who, since the non-aggression pact, have refused to be fooled by pleasant ideas. But this is a great moment: in the monstrous division of Poland, not to mention an independent Polish “buffer state”, in which the freedom and the resulting threat to Estonia`s freedom and the resulting threat to the other Baltic States, in the new pressures on all balkan countries and in the strategy that ensue , whatever it is accurate, be used to end the Western war and leave Russia in possession of its loot. On August 25, 1939, the New York Times published a front page of Otto D. Tolischus, “Nazi Talks Secret,” one of whose subtitles were “the Soviet Accords and the Empire`s Agreements on the East.”  On August 26, 1939, the New York Times reported on Japanese anger and the French communist surprise over the pact. But on the same day, Tolichus filed a story that was recorded by Nazi troops on the way to Gleiwitz (now Gliwice), which led to the Gleiwitz incident, on August 31, 1939, under the false flag.
 On August 28, 1939, the New York Times reported the fear of a robbery on Gleiwitz.  On August 29, 1939, the New York Times reported that the Supreme Soviet had failed on the first day of its convening for the Covenant Act.  On the same day, the New York Times also reported from Montreal, Canada, that American professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago had publicly expressed his belief that “the Russian-German non-aggression pact concealed an agreement that Russia and Germany could have served spheres of influence for Eastern Europe.”  On August 30, 1939, the New York Times reported a Soviet construction on its western borders, moving 200,000 soldiers from the Far East.  The public-Danish-Soviet non-aggression pact caused consternation in British and French capitals. After Germany invaded Poland from the west on September 1, 1939, Soviet troops invaded Poland from the east on September 17 and met two days later with the Germans advancing near Brest-Litovsk. The division of Poland took place on 29 September, when the demarcation line between German and Soviet territory was modified in favour of Germany and transferred eastward to the bow (i.e. the current Polish-Soviet border). Soon after, the Soviets attempted to consolidate their sphere of influence as an obstacle to further German aggression in the east.