Safeguards Agreement

The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is necessary for non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT and is an option for non-NPT members. When concluding a CSA with the IAEA, states must, in a first report, indicate the nature and quantity of the material for which protective measures must be taken. The IAEA examines whether a state`s declaration on nuclear materials is correct and complete. A CSA also gives the IAEA the power to independently verify that all nuclear materials in the territory or judicial control of a state are not diverted for the purpose of nuclear weapons or explosives and that nuclear facilities are not misused. The IAEA and Canada concluded the first safeguard agreement in 1959, and in 1961 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a document out of the principles of protection. Since 1961, the scope and application of safeguards have changed. As part of a generalised safeguards agreement, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that the security arrangements of all nuclear materials on the territory, in jurisdiction or under state control apply exclusively for verification purposes, so that these materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In addition to strengthening safeguards through the adoption of the Additional Protocol model in the late 1990s and 2000s, the IAEA has also developed methods to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of implementing safeguards for states where CSAs and APS are in force. The IAEA has launched a “state-level approach” to assess state compliance with protection agreements in a comprehensive manner and not on the basis of a facility of establishment. It has also begun to adopt “broader conclusions” for states in order to facilitate the burden of implementation by applying the approach at the national level.

The second part of the “93-2 programme” required a formal extension of the Agency`s legal mandate in the form of an additional protocol, to be adopted by each NPT member, in order to complement its existing IAEA safeguard agreement. On 15 May 1997, the IAEA adopted a model Memorandum of Understanding. The core of the additional protocol is to transform the IAEA guarantee regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared activities into a qualitative system to obtain an overview of a state`s nuclear and nuclear activities, including all nuclear imports and exports. The additional protocol also significantly expands the IAEA`s ability to search for secret nuclear facilities, giving the Authority the power to visit any declared or unreported body to examine issues or inconsistencies in a state`s nuclear declarations. The parties to the NPT are not required to adopt an additional protocol, although the IAEA invites all to do so.